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We analyze the security and reliability of a recently proposed class of public-key cryptosystems
against attacks by unauthorized parties who have acquired partial knowledge of one or more of the
private key components and/or of the plaintext. Phase diagrams are presented, showing critical
partial knowledge levels required for unauthorized decryption.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An important aspect in many modern communication systems is the ability to exclude unauthorized parties from
gaining access to confidential material. Although cryptosystems in general have an extensive history, until fairly
recently they have been based on simple variations of the same theme: information security among authorized parties
relies on sharing a secret key which is to be used for encryption and decryption of transmitted messages. While in this
way confidentiality of the sent message may be secured, such systems suffer from the (obvious) drawback of non-secure
key distribution.
In 1978 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman first devised a way to resolve this problem which led to the celebrated RSA
public-key cryptosystem [1] (for historical accuracy, a similar system has been suggested years earlier in the British
GCHQ but was kept secret). The idea behind public key cryptosystems is to differentiate between the encryption- and
decryption-keys; private key(s) are assigned to authorized users, for decryption purposes, while transmitting parties
only need to know the matching encryption (public) key [2]. The two keys are related by a function which generates the
encryption mechanism from the decryption key with low computational costs, while the opposite operation (evaluating
the decryption key from the encryption mechanism) is computationally infeasible. Such functions are called ‘one-way’
or trap-door functions; the RSA algorithm for instance, is based on the intractability of factorizing large integers
generated by taking the product of two large prime numbers.
The proliferation of digital communication in the last few decades has brought in a demand for secure communi-
cation leading to the invention of several other public-key cryptosystems, most notable of which are the El-Gammal
cryptosystem (based on the Discrete Logarithm problem), systems based on elliptic curves and the McEliece cryp-
tosystem (based on linear error-correcting codes) [3]. A common denominator of all public-key algorithms is the high
computational complexity of the task facing the unauthorized user; this is typically related to hard computational
problems that cannot be solved in practical time scales.
A new public-key cryptosystem based on a diluted Ising spin-glass system has been recently proposed in [4]. The
suggested cryptosystem is similar in spirit to that of McEliece and relies on exploiting physical properties of the
MacKay-Neal (MN) low-density parity-check (LDPC) error-correcting codes. In particular, in the context of MN
codes it has been shown [4, 5, 6] that for certain parameter values successful decoding is highly likely, while for
others (particularly when the number of parity-checks per bit and the number of bits per check tend to infinity) the
‘perfect’ solution, describing full retrieval of the sent message, admits only a very narrow basin of attraction; iterative
algorithmic solutions lead in this case, almost certainly, to a decryption failure. One can use these properties to
devise an LDPC based cryptosystem [4]. The narrow basin of attraction ensures that a random initialization of the
decryption equations will fail to converge to the plaintext solution while the naive approach of trying all possible
initializations is clearly doomed for a sufficiently large plaintext size. The ‘one-way’ function relies on the hard
computational task of decomposing a dense matrix (the public key) into a combination of sparse and dense matrices
(private keys) [7].
In this paper we examine the suggested cryptosystem from an adversary’s viewpoint. We consider an unauthorized
party that has acquired partial or full knowledge of one or more of the private keys, and/or of the message, and we
evaluate the critical knowledge levels required for unauthorized decryption. In addition, we examine the decryption
reliability by authorized users due to the probabilistic nature of the cryptosystem.
The paper is organized as follows: In the following section we give an outline of the suggested cryptosystem. In
section III we formulate unauthorized-decryption scenarios with partial knowledge based on a statistical mechanical
2framework. In section IV we derive the observable quantity that measures decryption success of the unauthorized user
as a function of the attack parameters and in section V we examine various cases and present numerical results as well
as the related phase diagrams. In sections VI and VII we briefly study the basin of attraction of the ferromagnetic
solution, and the reliability of the decryption mechanism (for authorized users), respectively. The implication of the
analysis are discussed in section VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE CRYPTOSYSTEM
The cryptosystem suggested in [4] is based on the framework of MN error-correcting codes [5]. An outline of the
encryption/decryption process is as follows.
A plaintext represented by ξ ∈ {0, 1}N is encrypted to the ciphertext r ∈ {0, 1}M (with M > N) using a predeter-
mined generator matrix G ∈ {0, 1} and a corrupting vector ζ ∈ {0, 1}M with P (ζi) = p δζi,1 + (1 − p) δζi,0 for each
component 1 ≤ i ≤M ; the Kronecker tensor δab returns 1 when the arguments are equal (a = b) and zero otherwise.
The generated ciphertext is of the form:
r = Gξ + ζ (mod 2) (1)
The (M ×N) matrix G together with the corruption rate p ∈ [0, 1] constitute the public key.
The encryption matrix G is constructed by choosing a dense matrixD (of dimensionalityM×M) and two randomly-
selected sparse matrices A (of dimensionality M ×N) and B (of dimensionality M ×M) through G = B−1AD (mod
2). The matrices A and B are characterized by K and L non-zero elements per row and C and L non-zero elements
per column respectively. The resulting dense matrix G is modeled as being characterized by K ′ and C′ non-zero
elements per row and per column respectively with K ′, C′ → ∞ (while K ′/C′ = N/M is finite). In fact, the dense
matrix G is of an irregular form due to the inverse of the sparse matrix B as well as the product taken with the dense
matrix D; we will model the matrix G by a regular dense matrix to simplify the analysis. The parameters K,C and
L define a particular cryptosystem while the matrices A, B and D constitute the private key.
The authorized user may obtain the plaintext from the received ciphertext r by taking the (mod 2) product
Br = Aξ +Bζ. Finding a set of solutions σ and τ such that the equation
Aσ +Bτ = Aξ +Bζ (mod 2) (2)
is true will lead to candidate solutions of the decryption problem (of which the most probable one will be detected
according to a further selection criterion). For particular choices of K and L, solving the above equation can be
achieved via iterative methods which have common roots in both graphical models and physics of disordered systems
such as Belief Propagation [5] Belief Revision [8] and more recently Survey Propagation [9]; where state probabilities
for the decrypted message bits P (σ, τ |r) are calculated by solving iteratively a set of coupled equations, describing
conditional probabilities of the ciphertext bits given the plaintext and vice versa. This problem is identical to the
decoding problem of a regular MN error-correcting code; for the explicit iterative decoding equations see equations (55-
56) as well as [5, 10].
The unauthorized user, on the other hand, faces the task of finding the most probable solutions to the equation
Gξ + ζ = Gσ + τ (mod 2) . (3)
The above decryption equation is effectively identical to the decoding problem of Sourlas error-correcting codes [11],
with the public matrix G being dense. Most notably, in the context of Sourlas codes, finding solutions to (3) is strongly
dependent on initial conditions: for all initial conditions other than the plaintext itself, the iterative equations of Belief
Propagation will fail to converge to the plaintext solution [4, 5, 6, 12] such that obtaining the correct solution for (3)
without knowledge of the private key will become infeasible. Obtaining the private keys by decomposing G into A, B
and D is known to be a hard computational problem even if the values of K, C and L are known [7].
We would like to point to the fact that there may exist more than one triplet of matrices {A,B,D} such that
G = B−1AD. with D being a dense matrix, finding a set of matrices A′, B′ and D′ such that their combination
produces G = (B′)−1A′D′ requires an exponentially diverging number of operations, with respect to the system size,
making the decomposition computationally infeasible. For D = 1 (as was the original formulation in [4]) finding a
pair of sparse matrices A′ and B′ such that G = (B′)−1A′ requires only a number of operations that is polynomial in
N , and the cryptosystem is therefore not secure.
Other advantages and drawbacks of the new cryptosystem appear in [4].
3III. FORMULATION OF THE ATTACK
An essential ingredient of any cryptosystem is a certain level of robustness against attacks. The robustness of the
current cryptosystem against attacks with no additional secret information has already been reported in [4]. In this
section we study the vulnerability of the new cryptosystem to various attacks, characterized by partial knowledge of
the secret keys and/or the plaintext itself; the additional information manifests itself in a set of decryption equations
similar to (2) in which partial information of the secret keys (and plaintext) is used in conjunction with the publicly
available information of (3).
The cumulative information provided by the different sets of equations will potentially allow for a successful decryption.
To this extent, knowledge of the matrix B is of utmost importance since obtaining partial knowledge of the syndrome
vector and equation (2) is only accessible through decryption using the matrix B. Let us consider that an unauthorized
user has acquired knowledge of a number of rows γAM , γBM and γDM of the secret matrices A, B and D (with
γ⋆ ∈ [0, 1]). Relation (2) then provides γM ≡ min{γA, γB, γD}M decryption equations (4) based on sparse matrices.
To analyze the attack we will thus from now on assume that a block (γM × M) of all matrices is known to the
unauthorized user with γ ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, the products
∑M
j=1 Bijrj for i = 1, . . . , γM can be taken and the
unauthorized user will arrive at the following decryption problem:
private : (Aˆσ)i + (Bˆτ )i = (Aˆξ)i + (Bˆζ)i for rows i = 1, . . . , γM (4)
public : (Gσ)i + (Iτ )i = (Gξ)i + (Iζ)i for rows i = 1, . . . ,M (5)
where we absorbed the matrix D using σ → Dσ and ξ → Dξ; in practice, after decryption, one will have to use of
the inverted matrix D−1 to obtain the original plaintext. All solutions σ and τ will have to simultaneously satisfy
(4) and (5). The matrices Aˆ and Bˆ will be described by K and L non-zero elements per row. The average number of
known non-zero elements per column in Aˆ and Bˆ will be denoted C and L, respectively. Since γ is the probability of
selecting a non-zero element in the known part of the private key it follows that C = γC and L = γL. For all columns
j = 1, . . . ,M we will denote the number of non-zero elements in Aˆ and Bˆ by the random variables C˜j(=
∑γM
i=1 Aˆij)
and L˜j(=
∑γM
j=1 Bˆij) which are described by the distributions:
P (C˜j ;C) =
(
C
C˜j
)
γC˜j (1− γ)C−C˜j C˜j = 0, . . . , C (6)
P (L˜j;L) =
(
L
L˜j
)
γL˜j (1 − γ)L−L˜j L˜j = 0, . . . , L (7)
To facilitate the statistical mechanical description we will now replace the field {0, 1;+(mod 2)} by the more familiar
Ising spin representation [11] {−1, 1;×}. Equations (4) and (5) will also be modified: From the matrices Aˆ, Bˆ and
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FIG. 1: The matrix B of dimensionality M ×M used as a private key in decryption. The scenario we consider here is that
unauthorized users have acquired knowledge of γM rows of the matrix. The (γM ×M) block may have L˜j = 0, . . . , L non-zero
elements per column for all j.
4G, I we construct the binary tensors A = {A〈i1···iK ;j1···jL〉; 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iK ≤ N, 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jL ≤ M} and
G = {G〈i1···iK′ ;j〉; 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iK′ ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ M}. The elements of these tensors are A〈i1...iK ;j1...jL〉 = 1
if Aˆ and Bˆ have respectively a row in which the elements {i1, . . . , iK} and {j1, . . . , jL} are all 1 and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, G〈i1...iK′ ;j〉 = 1 if G and I have respectively a row in which the elements {i1, · · · , iK′} and {j} are all 1
and 0 otherwise. The notation we used to indicate tensor elements, 〈i1 . . . iK〉, denotes that the sites i1, . . . , iK are
ordered and different.
The fact that the number of non-zero elements per column in Aˆ, Bˆ and G, I, respectively, are C˜i, L˜i and C
′, 1, for
all columns, will be imposed by the constraints:∑
i2···iK ;j1···jL
A〈i1···iK ;j1···jL〉 = C˜i1 ∀i1 = 1, · · · ,M (8)
∑
i1···iK ;j2···jL
A〈i1···iK ;j1···jL〉 = L˜j1 ∀j1 = 1, · · · ,M (9)
∑
i2···iK′ ;j
G〈i1···iK′ ;j〉 = C
′ ∀i1 = 1, · · · ,M (10)
∑
i1···iK′
G〈i1···iK′ ;j〉 = 1 ∀j = 1, · · · ,M (11)
To compress notation in what follows we will denote the set of indices involved in the tensors A and G by ΛK =
〈i1 · · · iK〉 and ΩL = 〈j1 · · · jL〉.
For the system described in (4-5) the microscopic state probability P (σ, τ ) can be written as
P (σ, τ |ξ, ζ,A,G) =
1
Z
[∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,A) ∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,G) Φ(σ; ξ) Φ(τ ; ζ)] e−βH(σ,τ ) (12)
(notice that the dependence on ξ, ζ is not explicit, but through the received vector r) where Z is the partition function
and H(σ, τ ) the energy:
H(σ, τ ) = −Fσ
N∑
i=1
σi − Fτ
M∑
j=1
τj (13)
with Fσ =
1
2 log
1−pσ
pσ
and Fτ =
1
2 log
1−pτ
pτ
. The fields Fσ and Fτ represent prior knowledge of the statistics from
which the plaintext and the corrupting vector are drawn, such that
P (ξi) = (1− pσ)δξi,1 + pσδξi,−1 pσ ∈ [0, 1] (14)
P (ζj) = (1 − pτ )δζj ,1 + pτδζj ,−1 pτ ∈ [0, 1] (15)
The indicator functions ∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,A) and ∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,G) restrict the space of solutions σ ∈ {−1, 1}N and τ ∈
{−1, 1}M to those that obey equations (4) and (5):
∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,A) =
∏
ΛKΩL

1 + 1
2
AΛKΩL(
∏
i∈ΛK
σiξi
∏
j∈ΩL
τjζj − 1)

 (16)
∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,G) =
∏
ΛK′ΩL′

1 + 1
2
GΛK′ΩL′ (
∏
i∈ΛK′
σiξi
∏
j∈ΩL′
τjζj − 1)

 (17)
and finally the terms Φ(· · ·) ∈ {0, 1} correspond to
Φ(σ; ξ) =
N∏
i=1
[(1− ci) + ciδσi,ξi ] (18)
Φ(τ ; ζ) =
M∏
i=1
[(1− di) + diδτi,ζi ] (19)
5where the quenched variables ci, dj ∈ {0, 1} model prior knowledge of bits of the plaintext and the corrupting vector
such that if for some i the plaintext bit ξi is known then the thermal variable σi takes the quenched plaintext value
(and similarly for the corruption vector ζj and τj). For the distribution of ci and dj we will consider
P (ci) = wσ δci,1 + (1− wσ) δci,0 wσ ∈ [0, 1] (20)
P (dj) = wτ δdj,1 + (1− wτ ) δdj ,0 wτ ∈ [0, 1] (21)
The system described by (12) represents a set of variables interacting via multi-spin ferromagnetic couplings of finite
connectivity, represented by a combination of matrices, in the presence of the random fields ξiFσ and ζjFτ . At β = 1
(which corresponds to the Nishimori temperature [13]) we will evaluate the free energy per plaintext bit
f = − lim
N→∞
1
βN
〈logZ〉Γ (22)
The macroscopic observable we are interested in calculating is the overlap m = limN→∞
1
N
∑
i ξiξˆi between the plain-
text and the Bayes Marginal Posterior Maximizer (MPM) estimate of the plaintext ξˆi ≡ sign
∑
σi=±
σi p(σi|r) where
p(σi|r) is the microscopic state probability (12). Disorder averages 〈〉Γ are taken over the probability distributions
(14,15,20,21) and over the distribution of the tensors A and G obeying the constrains (8-11):
〈F (A)〉A,{C˜i,L˜i} =
1
N
∑
{AΛKΩL}
N∏
i=1
〈
δ

 ∑
ΛKΩL/i∈ΛK
AΛKΩL − C˜i


〉
P (C˜i)
×
M∏
j=1
〈
δ

 ∑
ΛKΩL/j∈ΩL
AΛKΩL − L˜j

〉
P (L˜j)
F(A) (23)
〈F (G)〉G =
1
N ′
∑
{GΛ
K′
Ω
L′
}
N∏
i=1
δ

 ∑
ΛK′ΩL′/i∈ΛK′
AΛK′ΩL′ − C
′


×
M∏
j=1
δ

 ∑
ΛK′ΩL′/j1∈ΩL′
GΛK′ΩL′ − 1

F(G) (24)
where N and N ′ are the corresponding normalisation constants.
The parameters wσ, wτ , Fσ, Fτ and γ describe the attack characteristics.
IV. THE FREE ENERGY AND DECRYPTION OBSERVABLES
The calculation generally follows that of [6, 10]. To perform the various disorder averages we begin by invoking the
replica identity 〈logZ〉 = limn→0
1
n log〈Z
n〉 and making the gauge transformations σi → σiξi, τi → τiζi, AΛKΩL →
AΛKΩL
∏
i∈ΛK
ξi
∏
j∈ΩL
ζj and GΛK′ΩL′ → GΛK′ΩL′
∏
i∈ΛK′
ξi
∏
j∈ΩL′
ζj . This will allow us to disentangle the variables
{ξ, ζ} from expressions involving the tensors A and G in (16,17). Replacing the δ functions in (23,24) by their integral
representations allows us to perform the tensor summations, leading to:
〈∆A(σ, τ ),∆G(σ, τ ) 〉 =
=
1
NN ′
∮ ∏N
i=1 dZidXi
(2pi)2N
∮ ∏M
j=1 dYjdVj
(2pi)2M
×
N∏
i=1
〈
Z
−(C˜i+1)
i X
−(C′+1)
i
〉
P (C˜i)
M∏
j=1
〈
Y
−(L˜j+1)
j V
−2
j
〉
P (L˜j)
× e(
1
2
)n
∑n
m=0
∑
〈α1···αm〉
1
K! (
∑N
i=1
Ziσ
α1
i
···σαm
i )
K 1
L!(
∑M
j=1
Yjτ
α1
j
···ταm
j )
L
× e(
1
2
)n
∑
n
m=0
∑
〈α1···αm〉
1
K′!(
∑
N
i=1Xiσ
α1
i
···σαm
i )
K′
(
∑
M
j=1 Vjτ
α1
j
···ταm
j ) (25)
6In the above expression we can now identify the following order parameters
qα1···αm =
N∑
i=1
Ziσ
α1
i · · ·σ
αm
i rα1···αm =
N∑
i=1
Xiσ
α1
i · · ·σ
αm
i (26)
tα1···αm =
M∑
j=1
Yjτ
α1
j · · · τ
αm
j uα1···αm =
M∑
j=1
Vjτ
α1
j · · · τ
αm
j (27)
which we insert in (25) via suitably defined δ functions (giving rise to the Lagrange multipliers qˆα1···αm , rˆα1···αm ,
tˆα1···αm and uˆα1···αm). To proceed with the calculation one needs to assume a certain order parameter symmetry for
the above quantities and their conjugates for all m > 1. The simplest such assumption renders all replica m-tuples
equivalent and all order parameters within this replica symmetric scheme need only depend on the number m. This
effect can be described by the introduction of suitably defined distributions, the moments of which completely define
the m-index order parameters
qα1···αm = q
∫
dx pi(x) xm qˆα1···αm = qˆ
∫
dx pˆi(x) xm (28)
rα1···αm = r
∫
dy ρ(y) ym rˆα1···αm = rˆ
∫
dy ρˆ(y) ym (29)
tα1···αm = t
∫
dx φ(x) xm tˆα1···αm = tˆ
∫
dx φˆ(x) xm (30)
uα1···αm = u
∫
dy ψ(y) ym uˆα1···αm = uˆ
∫
dy ψˆ(y) ym (31)
where all integrals are over the interval [−1, 1]. The Nishimori condition (β = 1), which corresponds to MPM
decoding [14], also ensures that this simplest replica-symmetric scheme is sufficient to describe the thermodynamically
dominant state [13, 15]. Furthermore, it is worthwhile mentioning that extending the replica symmetric calculation
to include the one-step replica symmetry breaking ansatz is unlikely to modify the location of the transition points
identified under the replica-symmetric ansatz, as has been recently shown in a similar system [16]. Using the above
ansatz we perform the contour integrals in (25), and trace over the spin variables; then, in the limit n→ 0 we obtain:
− βf = Extr
{
−CJ1a[pi, pˆi]−
CL
K
J1b[ρ, ρˆ]− C
′J1c[φ, φˆ]−
C′
K ′
J1d[ψ, ψˆ] (32)
+
C
K
J2a[pi, ρ] +
C′
K ′
J2b[φ, ψ] + J3a[pˆi, φˆ] +
C
K
L
L
J3b[ρˆ, ψˆ]
}
−
(
C
K
+
C′
K ′
)
log 2
where the extremization is taken over the distributions defined in (28-31) and the various integrals J⋆⋆ are given by
J1a[pi, pˆi] =
∫
dxdxˆ pi(x)pˆi(xˆ) log(1 + xxˆ) J1b[ρ, ρˆ] =
∫
dydyˆ ρ(y)ρˆ(yˆ) log(1 + yyˆ) (33)
J1c[φ, φˆ] =
∫
dxdxˆ φ(x)φˆ(xˆ) log(1 + xxˆ) J1d[ψ, ψˆ] =
∫
dydyˆ ψ(y)ψˆ(yˆ) log(1 + yyˆ) (34)
J2a[pi, ρ] =
∫
[
K∏
k=1
dxk pi(xk)
L∏
ℓ=1
dyℓ ρ(yℓ)] log(1 +
∏
k
xk
∏
ℓ
yℓ) (35)
J2b[φ, ψ] =
∫
dy ψ(y) [
K′∏
k=1
dxk φ(xk)] log(1 + y
∏
k
xk) (36)
7J3a[pˆi, φˆ] =
∫ C′∏
c′=1
dφˆ(yc′)

(1− γ)C
〈
log
∑
λ=±
[(1− c) + cδλ,1]e
βFσξλ
∏
c′
(1 + yc′λ)
〉
c,ξ
+
〈∫
[
C˜∏
c=1
dpˆi(xc)]
〈
log
∑
λ=±
[(1− c) + cδλ,1]e
βFσξσ
∏
c
(1 + xcλ)
∏
c′
(1 + yc′λ)
〉
c,ξ
〉
C˜

 (37)
J3b[ρˆ, ψˆ] =
∫
dy ψˆ(y)

(1− γ)L
〈
log
∑
λ=±
[(1 − d) + dδλ,1]e
βFτζλ(1 + yλ)
〉
d,ζ
+
〈∫
[
L˜∏
ℓ=1
dρˆ(xℓ)]
〈
log
∑
λ=±
[(1− d) + dδλ,1]e
βFτζλ
∏
ℓ
(1 + xℓλ)(1 + yλ)
〉
d,ζ
〉
L˜

 (38)
where
C =
C∑
C˜=0
P (C˜;C) C˜ L =
L∑
L˜=0
P (L˜;L) L˜ (39)
Averages denoted 〈· · ·〉C˜ and 〈· · ·〉L˜ are over the densities (6) and (7) with C˜ = 1, . . . , C and L˜ = 1, . . . , L. Functional
differentiation of (32) with respect to the densities of (28-31) results in the following saddle point equations:
pˆi(xˆ) =
∫
[
K−1∏
k=1
dxkpi(xk)
L∏
l=1
dylρ(yl)] δ
[
xˆ−
K−1∏
k=1
xk
L∏
l=1
yl
]
(40)
ρˆ(yˆ) =
∫
[
K∏
k=1
dxkpi(xk)
L−1∏
l=1
dylρ(yl)] δ
[
yˆ −
K∏
k=1
xk
L−1∏
l=1
yl
]
(41)
φˆ(xˆ) =
∫
dyψ(y) [
K′−1∏
k=1
dxkφ(xk)] δ

xˆ− yK
′−1∏
k=1
xk

 (42)
ψˆ(yˆ) =
∫
[
K′∏
k=1
dxkφ(xk)] δ

yˆ − K
′∏
k=1
xk

 (43)
and
pi(x) = wσ δ[x− 1] (44)
+
(1− wσ)
C
〈
C˜
∫
[
C′∏
c′=1
dφˆ(yˆc′)
C˜−1∏
c=1
dpˆi(xˆc)]
〈
δ

x− tanh[βFσξ + C˜−1∑
c=1
ath(xˆc) +
C′∑
c′=1
ath(yˆc′)]


〉
ξ
〉
C˜
ρ(x) = wτ δ[x− 1] (45)
+
(1− wτ )
L
〈
L˜
∫
dψˆ(yˆ) [
L˜−1∏
l=1
dρˆ(yˆl)]
〈
δ

x− tanh[βFτ ζ + L˜−1∑
l=1
ath(xˆl) + ath(yˆ)]


〉
ζ
〉
L˜
φ(x) = wσ δ[x− 1] (46)
+(1− wσ)
∫ C′−1∏
c′=1
dφˆ(yc′)

(1− γ)C
〈
δ

x− tanh[βFσξ + C
′−1∑
c′=1
ath(yˆc′)]


〉
ξ
+
〈∫
[
C˜∏
c=1
dpˆi(xˆc)]
〈
δ

x− tanh[βFσξ + C˜∑
c=1
ath(xˆc) +
C′−1∑
c′=1
ath(yˆc′)]

〉
ξ
〉
C˜


8ψ(x) = wτ δ[x− 1] (47)
+(1− wτ )

(1− γ)L 〈δ[x− tanh(βFτ ζ)]〉ζ +
〈∫
[
L˜∏
l=1
dρˆ(xˆl)]
〈
δ

x− tanh[βFτ ζ + L˜∑
l=1
ath(xˆl)]


〉
ζ
〉
L˜


In general, the coupled set of equations (40)-(47) are to be solved numerically. Among the set of σ that satisfy
equations (4) and (5) we choose the MPM estimate of the plaintext ξˆi = sign
∑
σi=±
σi p(σi|r) = sign〈σi〉 (thermal
average) by using Nishimori’s condition (or β = 1) [13]. Then, the overlap m = limN→∞
1
N
∑
i ξiξˆi becomes
m = wσ + (1 − wσ)
∫
dh P (h) sign(h) (48)
P (h) =
∫ C′∏
c′=1
dφˆ(yˆc′)]

(1− γ)C
〈
δ

h− tanh[βFσξ + C
′∑
c′=1
ath(yˆc′)]


〉
ξ
+
〈∫
[
C˜∏
c=1
dpˆi(xˆc)]
〈
δ

h− tanh[βFσξ + C˜∑
c=1
ath(xˆc) +
C′∑
c′=1
ath(yˆy′)]

〉
ξ
〉
C˜

 (49)
from which it can be seen that the perfect (ferromagnetic) solution m = 1 is achieved when wσ = 1 (complete
knowledge of the solution) or when φˆ(x) = δ[x − 1]. This also implies that all densities involved in (32) λ(x) =
{pi(x), . . . , ψˆ(x)} acquire the form λ(x) = δ[x− 1] giving a free energy of the form
fFM =
(
C′
K ′
−
C
K
)
log 2−
C
K
βFτ 〈ζ〉ζ (50)
The physical meaning of the terms w⋆ δ[x−1] in (44-47) is that the acquired microscopic knowledge gives a probabilistic
weight at the ferromagnetic state. The state m = 0 is obtained if wσ = Fσ = 0 and pˆi(x) = φˆ(x) = δ[x] (paramagnetic
solution).
V. PHASE DIAGRAMS
In this section we obtain numerical solutions for various attack scenarios. In all cases studied we assume an
unbiased plaintext (pσ = 1/2, Fσ = 0); for brevity we refer to the remaining bias parameter, the corruption level
denoted pτ in previous sections, simply as p. All experiments have been carried out using a regular cryptosystem with
K = L = 2, being the original cryptosystem suggested in [4]. In principle, one can use any set of regular or irregular
matrices, provided one identifies the corresponding dynamical transition point. However, having been thoroughly
studied previously, the current construction serves as a particularly suited benchmark.
Solving the coupled equations (40-47) we typically observe that for sufficiently small values of p the ferromagnetic
state m = 1 is the only stable solution whereas at a corruption value that marks the dynamical (spinodal) transition
ps, an exponential number of solutions with m 6= 1 are created (either suboptimal ferromagnetic or paramagnetic,
depending on the values of (K,C,L)). For all p > ps perfect decryption will be difficult to obtain. This transition
also defines the corruption level below which an unauthorized attacker, that have acquired partial information of the
secret keys, will be successful.
We will concentrate on two main attacks: (i) The attacker has partial knowledge of the keys (primarily the matrix
B). (ii) The attacker has partial microscopic knowledge of the plaintext and/or corruption vector.
In figure 2 we present a phase diagram describing regions with perfect (m = 1) or partial/null (|m| < 1) decryption
success as evaluated from solving equations (32) and (48). We plot the dynamical transition corruption level ps as
a function of the private key fractional knowledge γ for different values of wσ and wτ (we have set pσ = 1/2 which
corresponds to an ‘unbiased’ plaintext). In the limit γ = 0 (i.e., no knowledge of the matrices), while m = 1 may be a
stable solution, the decryption dynamics is fully dominated by |m| < 1 states. For γ = 1 the cryptosystem describes
a specific MN code and perfect decryption can occur below ps.
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram of the spinodal corruption-rate against the fractional knowledge of the private key γ for a (K,C,L) =
(2, 6, 2) cryptosystem for (wσ, wτ ) = (0, 0) (solid line) and (0.2, 0.2) (dashed line). Microscopic knowledge of the plaintext and
the corrupting vector enlarges the perfect decryption area, as expected.
The interaction between the sparsely (4) and densely (5) connected decryption components is non-linear and non-
trivial; however, as a first approximation one can view the fractional matrix knowledge γ as changing the effective
sparse component, which is the main contributor in the decryption process. To that end γ will have a direct impact
on the effective code rate N/(Mγ), the average connectivity γC and the connectivity distribution. It is clear that
at an effective code rate 1 (γ = N/M = 1/3 in the case of the parameters used in figure 2) decryption is even not
theoretically feasible. The reason figure 2 points to a possibility of decryption below this value is due to additional
information brought in by the dense components we ignored in this simplistic description.
We also examined the effect of prior microscopic knowledge of the plaintext/corrupting vector (wσ, wτ > 0) on the
area of perfect decryption; which clearly increases with the knowledge provided, as expected. Also this can be viewed
as a change to the effective code rate. This time, the partial microscopic knowledge of either plaintext or corrupting
vector (or both) serves to reduce the effective number of variables and hence the code rate itself; lower code rate will
typically allow for perfect decryption in worse corruption conditions as can be seen in figure 2
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FIG. 3: Phase diagrams of the spinodal corruption-rates against the fractional knowledge of the private key γ for a (K,C,L) =
(2, 6, 2) cryptosystem. Left picture: (wσ, wτ ) = (0.1, 0) (solid line) and (0, 0.1) (dashed line). Right picture: (wσ, wτ ) = (0.2, 0)
(solid line) and (0, 0.2) (dashed line). For sufficiently large γ-values microscopic knowledge of the corrupting vector becomes
more important to the unauthorized user than that of the plaintext; this effect becomes more emphasized as the fraction of
known bits increases.
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FIG. 4: Left: Comparison between two different cryptosystems with (K,C,L) = (2, 3, 2) (solid line) and (K,C,L) = (2, 4, 2)
(dashed line). Smaller C-values correspond to higher rate codes and lead to smaller regions in parameter space where perfect
decryption is possible. Right: Overlap m as function of the corrupting-rate p obtained from equation (48) for a (K,C,L) =
(2, 6, 2) cryptosystem and along the line γ = 0.8 for (wσ, wτ ) = (0.2, 0) (solid line) and (wσ, wτ ) = (0, 0) (dashed line).
To understand the implication of these results let us assume using the cryptosystem described in figure 2 at a
corruption level chosen of p = 0.1 (which is chosen much smaller that ps to increase the decryption reliability). In
this case knowing about 70% of the matrices (secret keys) will be sufficient for decrypting the ciphertext. True, there
is still a need to know the dense matrix D−1 for extracting the plaintext itself and the exposed fraction of the secret
key is significant; but still there is a weakness that may be exploited by a skillful attacker.
To compare the importance of prior microscopic knowledge of plaintext versus that of the corrupting vector we
plotted in figure 3 the phase diagram for (wσ , wτ ) = {(0.1, 0), (0.2, 0)} and (wσ , wτ ) = {(0, 0.1), (0, 0.2)}which describe
two complementary scenarios (left and right figures respectively). The effect is quite similar, taking into account the
information provided by the two vectors (the plaintext is unbiased but of length N while the corruption vector is
biased but of lengthM). For high γ-values microscopic knowledge of the corrupting vector becomes more informative
than that of the plaintext, an effect which becomes more emphasized as the fraction of known bits increases.
In figure 4 we compare two cryptosystems with (K,C,L) = (2, 4, 2) and (K,C,L) = (2, 3, 2) for (wσ, wτ ) = (0, 0).
We see that smaller C values (i.e., higher code rates) will reduce the area of perfect decryption. On the one hand,
this will increase the secret information required for perfect decryption at each corruption level; on the other hand it
will reduce the corruption level that can be used and will expose the cryptosystem to attacks based on an exhaustive
search of corruption vectors.
The security of a cryptosystem may be compromised without a full recovery of the plaintext; also partial recovery of
the plaintext may pose a significant threat. To study the effect of partial knowledge of the matrices and plaintext on
the ability to obtain high overlap between the decrypted ciphertext and plaintext, we conducted several experiments,
an example of which appears in figure 4. Here we show the overlap obtained m as function of the corruption-rate p
for a specific cryptosystem (K,C,L) = (2, 6, 2) along the line γ = 0.8 and for two different choices of wσ. Prior to
the dynamical transition points both ciphertexts are decrypted perfectly; this corresponds to corruption and partial
knowledge levels below the solid and dashed lines of figure 2.
Above the dynamical transition point, new suboptimal solutions are created and the overlap value obtained dete-
riorates with the corruption level. However, the two different choices of wσ-values lead to two different deterioration
patterns: while overlap in the system with no microscopic knowledge of the plaintext deteriorates very rapidly, the
system with wσ = 0.2 provides solutions with high overlap values even if the corruption is high. As a consequence, we
see that the effect of microscopic knowledge goes beyond a shift in the dynamical transition point; it also influences
decryption beyond that point (in fact, it goes even beyond Shannon’s limit).
VI. BASIN OF ATTRACTION
The increasingly narrowing basin of attraction for the ferromagnetic solution, as the connectivity values K,C and
L → ∞, is central to the security level offered by the cryptosystem. The effect has been reported in a number of
papers in the statistical physics [4, 12] and information-theory [5] literature; in this section we will show that the
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basin of attraction shrinks as the connectivity increases, to a value of O(1/K) as K,C →∞.
To provide a rough evaluation of the basin of attraction (BOA) for obtaining the ferromagnetic solution we focus on
Eq. (2) in the limit K,C →∞. BOA clearly depends on the algorithm used; here we focus on the Belief Propagation
(BP) algorithm, which is empirically known to be the best practical algorithm for solving problems of the current
type. As far as we explored, no other schemes such as the naive mean field and the Belief Revision algorithms exhibit
better performance than BP, which implies that our consideration on BP is at least of a certain practical significance
(Survey Propagation [9] has not yet been tested for these systems).
Let us represent prior knowledge on plain text ξ and noise ζ (in Ising spin representation) as the prior probabilities
P oi (σi) =
exp(Fσiσi)
2 cosh(Fσi)
, (51)
P oj (τj) =
exp(Fτjτj)
2 cosh(Fτj)
, (52)
respectively. Here, the parameters Fσi and Fτj express confidence of the prior knowledge per variable, which is a
generalization of the global prior terms Fσ, Fτ used earlier. Notice that this representation includes the case that
certain bits are completely determined by setting |Fσi|(or |Fτj |) → ∞, enabling us to cover various scenarios. In
the following, we assume that the fraction of completely determined bits is less than 1 when N,M → ∞. Given
prior probabilities (51) and (52), and the indicator function ∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,A) which is the alternative to parity check
equation (2), the Bayesian framework provides the posterior probability
P post(σ, τ ) =
∆(σ, τ ; ξ, ζ,A)
∏N
i=1 P
o
i (σi)
∏M
j=1 P
o
j (τi)
Z
, (53)
where Z is the normalization constant. Using Eq. (53), one can determine the best possible action for minimizing
the expected value of a given cost function [14]. As a cost function, we select here the Hamming distance between
the correct plain text ξ and its estimates ξˆ, L(ξˆ, ξ) = N −
∑N
i=1 ξˆiξi; this selection naturally offers the maximizer of
posterior marginal (MPM) decoding ξˆi = sign(m
σ
i ) as the optimal estimation strategy, where
mσi =
∑
σ,τ
σi P
post(σ, τ ), (54)
is the average of spin σi over the posterior probability and sign(x) = 1 for x > 0 and −1, otherwise.
Computational cost for an exact evaluation of the spin average (54) increases as O(2N+M ), which implies that
MPM decoding is practically difficult. An alternative approach is to resort to an approximation such as BP. In the
current case, this means to iteratively solving the coupled equations (for details of the derivation see [5, 10])
mˆσµi = Jµ
∏
l∈Lσ(µ)\i
mσµl
∏
j∈Lτ (µ)
mτµj , mˆ
τ
µj = Jµ
∏
l∈Lσ(µ)
mσµl
∏
k∈Lτ (µ)\j
mτµk, (55)
mσµi = tanh(Fσi +
∑
ν∈Mσ(i)\µ
ath(mˆσνi)), m
τ
µj = tanh(Fτj +
∑
ν∈Mτ (j)\µ
ath(mˆτνj)), (56)
where Jµ ≡
(∏
l∈Lσ(µ) ξl
∏
j∈Lτ (µ) ζj
)
, Lσ(µ) and Lτ (µ) are the sets of indices of non-zero elements in µth row of
A and B, respectively, and Mσ(i) and Mτ (j) are similarly defined for columns of A and B, respectively. Lσ(µ)\i
denotes a set of indices in Lσ other than i, and similarly for other symbols. The variables m
σ/τ
µi and mˆ
σ/τ
µi represent
pseudo posterior averages of σi (or τj) when the µth check Jµ is left out, and the influence of a newly added Jµ on σi
(or τj), respectively (see [5, 10] for details). Using mˆ
σ
µi, the posterior average m
σ
i is obtained as
mσi = tanh(Fσi +
∑
µ∈Mσ(i)
ath(mˆσµi)). (57)
Let us investigate the condition necessary for finding the correct solution by iterating Eqs.(55) and (56) in the limit
K,C → ∞. For this purpose, we first employ the gauge transformation ξim
σ
µi → m
σ
µi, ξimˆ
σ
µi → mˆ
σ
µi, ζjm
τ
µj → m
τ
µj ,
ζjmˆ
τ
µj → mˆ
τ
µj and Jµ
(∏
l∈Lσ(µ) ξl
∏
j∈Lτ (µ) ζj
)
→ 1. This decouples the quenched random variables ξi and ζj from
Eq.(55), as Jµ becomes independent of the quenched variables, and the BP equations can be expressed as
mˆσµi =
∏
l∈Lσ(µ)\i
mσµl
∏
j∈Lτ (µ)
mτµj , mˆ
τ
µj =
∏
l∈Lσ(µ)
mσµl
∏
k∈Lτ (µ)\j
mτµk, (58)
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mσµi = tanh(F
σ
i ξi +
∑
ν∈Mσ(i)\µ
ath(mˆσνi)), m
τ
µj = tanh(F
τ
j ζj +
∑
ν∈Mτ (j)\µ
ath(mˆτνj)). (59)
The expression of the correct solution is also converted to mσµi = 1 and m
τ
µj = 1. Notice that any state which is
characterized by decreasing absolute values |mσµi| < 1 − ε and |m
τ
µi| < 1 − ε for an arbitrary fixed positive number
ε > 0 is attracted to a locally stable solution mˆσµi ∼ 0, mˆ
τ
µj ∼ 0, m
σ
µi = tanh(F
σ
i ξi) and m
τ
µj = tanh(F
τ
j ζj) for K →∞
in a single update since products on the right hand sides of Eq. (58) vanish. To provide a rough evaluation of the
BOA for the correct (ferromagnetic) solution mσµi = 1 and m
τ
µj = 1, let us assume that m
σ
µi and m
τ
µj are randomly
distributed at 1 − ε(K) and −(1 − ε(K)) with probabilities 1 − p(K) and p(K), respectively, where ε(K) and p(K)
are small parameters to characterize the BOA for a large K. Under this assumption, mˆσµi and mˆ
σ
µj are distributed at
±(1− ε(K))K+L ∼ ±(1− ε(K))K with probability (1± (1− 2p(K))K+L)/2 ∼ (1± (1− 2p(K))K)/2, respectively. If
either (1− ε(K))K or (1− 2p(K))K is negligible, the absolute values of mσµi and m
τ
µj become sufficiently smaller than
1, and therefore, the state is trapped in a locally stable solution in the second iteration [19]. This implies that the
critical condition is given by ε(K) ∼ O(1/K) and p(K) ∼ O(1/K) for large K. In terms of the macroscopic overlap,
this means m0cr ≈ 1−O(1/K).
VII. RELIABILITY
Unlike most of the commonly used cryptosystems which are based on a deterministic decryption procedure, the cur-
rent cryptosystem relies on a probabilistic decryption process. The evaluation of decryption success for an authorized
user is therefore as important as assessing the level of robustness against attacks.
In practical scenarios, decryption success generally depends on the plaintext size. Analysis of finite size effects in
the belief propagation based decryption procedure is difficult. A principled alternative that we pursue here is based
on evaluating the average error exponent of the current cryptosystem; this provides the expected error-level at any
given corruption level when maximum likelihood decoding is employed, and therefore represents a lower bound to the
expected error-rate. Moreover, the corruption levels employed are far below the critical (thermodynamic) transition
point, we therefore assume that belief propagation decryption will provide similar performance to maximum likelihood
decoding; clearly, the lower bound will become looser as we get close to the dynamical transition point.
The average block error rate PB(p) (i.e., erroneous decrypted plaintexts) takes the form
PB(p) = e
−ME(p) , (60)
where E(p) is the average error exponent per noise level p and M the length of the ciphertext (in the particular case
of LDPC codes we assume that short loops, which contribute polynomially to the block error probability [17], have
been removed). The quantity PB(p) represents the probability by which candidate solutions {σ, τ} are drawn from
the set of those satisfying equation (4) (with γ = 1; authorized decryption) other than the ones corresponding to the
true plaintext and corrupting vector, σ = ξ and τ = ζ, respectively. To evaluate this probability we introduce the
indicator function
Ψ(Γ) = lim
β→∞
lim
λ1,2→±λ
[
Zλ11 (Γ;β1) Z
λ2
2 (Γ;β2)
]
β1=β2=β
(61)
where Γ = {ξ, ζ,A} collectively denotes the set of quenched variables. The power λ ∈ [0, 1] is used in conjunction
with the partition functions
Z1(Γ;β1) =
∑
σ 6=ξ
∑
τ 6=ζ
e−β1H(σ,τ ) Z2(Γ;β2) =
∑
σ
∑
τ
e−β2H(σ,τ ) (62)
to provide an indicator function as explained below. The Hamiltonian H(σ, τ ) is given by (13) and the trace over spin
variables is restricted to those configurations satisfying equation (4). The above partition functions Z1 and Z2 differ
only in the exclusion of the true plaintext and corrupting vector in the trace over variables; this enables us to identify
instances where the maximum likelihood decoder chooses solutions that do not match the true (quenched variable)
vectors. The Hamiltonian (13) is proportional to the magnetizations mσ(σ) =
1
N
∑
i σi and mτ (τ ) =
1
M
∑
i τi.
Therefore, if the true plaintext and corrupting vectors have the highest magnetizations (decryption success), the
Boltzmann factor exp[−βH(σ, τ )] will dominate the sum over states in Z2 in the limit β → ∞ and Ψ(Γ) = 0.
Alternatively, if some other vectors σ 6= ξ and τ 6= ζ have the highest magnetizations of all candidates (decoding
failure), its Boltzmann factor will dominate both Z1 and Z2 so that Ψ(Γ) = 1. Separate temperatures β1,2 and powers
λ1,2 have been introduced to determine whether obtained solutions are physical or not (values of these parameters
will be obtained via the zero-entropy condition).
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FIG. 5: Reliability exponent (63) as a function of the corruption level p for the case K = L = 2 and rates R = 1/2 (dashed
line) and R = 1/4 (solid line).
To derive the average error exponent E(p) we take the logarithm of the above indicator function averaged with
respect to the disorder variables Γ = {ξ, ζ,A}
E(p) = lim
M→∞
1
M
log 〈Ψ(Γ)〉Γ (63)
The evaluation of (63) is similar in spirit to the analysis of section IV. For details of this calculation we refer the
reader to [18] where we also study and compare the reliability and average error exponents of various low-density
parity-check codes.
Results describing E(p) for authorised decryption of the cryptosystem [4] are presented in figure 5 where we plot
E(p) as function of the corruption level p for (K,C,L) = (2, 8, 2) (code-rate 1/4) and (K,C,L) = (2, 4, 2) (code-rate
1/2) cryptosystems. It is clear that decryption errors decay very fast with the system size as we go away from the
critical corruption level. For instance, in the case of R = 1/4, using a corruption level of p = 0.13 (Shannon’s limit is
at p = 0.20) and a modest ciphertext size of M = 1000 will result in a negligible block error probability PB = 10
−11.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have analyzed several security issues related to the recently suggested public-key cryptosystem of [4].
The suggested cryptosystem is based on the computational difficulty of decomposing a dense matrix into a combination
of dense and sparse matrices (obeying certain statistics) which is a known hard computational problem. We have
considered several attack scenarios in which unauthorized parties have acquired partial knowledge of one or more of
the private keys and/or microscopic knowledge of the plaintext and/or the ‘corrupting vector’. The analysis follows
standard statistical mechanical methods of dealing with diluted spin systems within replica symmetric considerations.
Of central importance to the unauthorized decryption is the dynamical transition which defines decryption success in
practical situations. Our phase diagrams show the dynamical threshold as a function of the partial acquired knowledge
of the private key; they describe regions with perfect- (m = 1) or partial/null decryption success (|m| < 1).
Public-key cryptosystems play an important role in modern communications. The increasing demand for secure
transmission of information has lead to the invention of novel cryptosystems in recent years. To this extent and
based on the insight gained by statistical physics analyses of error-correcting codes a new family of cryptosystems
was suggested in [4]. This paper constitutes a first step in studying this class of cryptosystems by considering the
potential success of possible attacks.
Several future research directions aimed at improving the security and reliability of this cryptosystem may in-
clude studying the efficacy of irregular code constructions and the use of novel decryption methods such as survey
propagation [9] for pushing the dynamical transition point closer to the information theoretic limits.
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